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ABSTRACT 
"In theory, theory and practice are the same, in practice they're not"-Yoggi Berra . 
Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMO) were established in the Agricultural Marketing 
Act of 1937. They were designed to reduce/eliminate the effects of milk pricing wars generated 
by processors that essentially had monopsony power when buying milk from producers as a 
result of seasonal production (Stillman; Kessel; Ladd; Blayney and Normile). More generally 
Masson and Eisenstat indicate that orders were to provide: a) orderly marketing, b) an adequate 
supply of milk and c) an increase in farmers' incomes. In practice, the establishment of the 
FMMO order system allowed a classified milk pricing system and dictated the minimum prices 
processors had to pay for milk associated with an order. The FMMO system still has its 
proponents while others believe the FMMO has too many problems and has outlived its 
usefulness(Marsh; Schiek). Some believe the system provides benefits besides classified pricing. 
"These include reducing price uncertainty for buyers and sellers, reducing, if not eliminating, 
incentives for destructive competition, and providing a framework to encourage rational and 
orderly marketing behaviors and outcomes." (Novakovic). However, these potential benefits do 
not come without a cost. Several authors have outlined these costs (Buxton; Dahlgren; Ippolito 
and Mason; Kessel; Ladd; McDowell, Fleming and Fallerts). The outcome of these studies 
indicate that prices paid by consumers and revenue received by producers are generally higher as 
a result of the FMMO system. However, the majority of these results are more than 20 years old 
and do not reflect recetnt structural changes in the industry, changes that could potentially alter 
the outcomes of these evaluations. Some of the important changes that have occurred in the last 
20 years include 
the following (Manchester and Blayney): 
1. Improved transportation which has facilitated the shipment of mille 
2. Refrigeration which allows milk to be safely shipped long distances from 
where it was produced. 
3. Fewer dairy farm operations. 
4. Increased size and concentration of dairy operations. 
5. A shift in the use of milk from fluid products to products, especially cheese, 
which can easily be stored and readily shipped. 
6. Consolidation of milk handling and processing operations (coops, handlers, 
manufacturers, etc) 
Some of the more recent work such as that by Blayney and Normile, Price, HeImberger 
and Chen have shown results that are similar to the older studies. But, as Blayney and 
Normile note "Because milk marketing orders-both Federal and State-have been in 
effect for so long, it is difficult to determine the extent to which these characteristics 
would emerge in the absence ofFMMO's." There continue to be proposals that would 
alter or eliminate the FMMO system but little analysis of these alternatives exist. Seibert 
et.al. indicated in 1997 that sweeping changes were needed in the FMMO system as a 
result of 
" ... the views held by producers and handlers that the present system has maj or 
flaws. Perceptions of advantages and disadvantages given to some at the expense 
of others, particularly on a regional basis have lead to protracted debate. The 
multifaceted character of this debate has pitted dairy farmer against dairy farmer, 
dairy farmer against handler, handler against handler and even economist against 
economist. ... Without industry cohesiveness, it is conceivable that an impasse 
could be reached resulting in elimination ofFMMO's, at least in some areas of 
the county, as early as April 1999." 
While no order was eliminated as early as these authors predicted, on April 1, 2004 a 
major l order was terminated ----order 135. 
1 A reduction in the number of orders occurred on January 1, 2000 but this did not involve 
termination of an order. At least one other order (Chicago) had been terminated in the 
past but no termination was as large, in terms of the volume of milk, as order 135. 
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Introduction 
((In theory, theory and practice are the same, in practice they're not"-Yoggi Berra 
Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMO) were established in the Agricultural Marketing 
Act of 1937. They were designed to reduce/eliminate the effects of milk pricing wars 
generated by processors that essentially had monopsony power when buying milk from 
producers as a result of seasonal production (Stillman; Kessel; Ladd; Blayney and Normile). 
More generally Masson and Eisenstat indicate that orders were to provide: a) orderly 
marketing, b) an adequate supply of milk and c) an increase in farmers' incomes. In practice, 
the establishment of the FMMO order system allowed a classified milk pricing system and 
dictated the minimum prices processors had to pay for milk associated with an order. The 
FMMO system still has its proponents while others believe the FMMO has too many 
problems and has outlived its usefulness(Marsh; Schiek). Some believe the system provides 
benefits besides classified pricing. "These include reducing price uncertainty for buyers and 
sellers, reducing, if not eliminating, incentives for destructive competition, and providing a 
framework to encourage rational and orderly marketing behaviors and outcomes." 
(Novakovic). However, these potential benefits do not come without a cost. Several authors 
have outlined these costs (Buxton; Dahlgren; Ippolito and Mason; Kessel; Ladd; McDowell, 
Fleming and Fallerts). The outcome of these studies indicate that prices paid by consumers 
and revenue received by producers are generally higher as a result of the FMMO system. 
However, the majority of these results are more than 20 years old and do not reflect recetnt 
structural changes in the industry, changes that could potentially alter the outcomes of these 
evaluations. Some of the important changes that have occurred in the last 20 years include 
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the following (Manchester and Blayney): 
1. Improved transportation which has facilitated the shipment of mille 
2. Refrigeration which allows milk to be safely shipped long distances from where it was 
produced. 
3. Fewer dairy farm operations. 
4. Increased size and concentration of dairy operations. 
5. A shift in the use of milk from fluid products to products, especially cheese, which can 
easily be stored and readily shipped. 
6. Consolidation of milk handling and processing operations (coops, handlers, 
manufacturers, etc) 
Some of the more recent work such as that by Blayney and Normile, Price, HeImberger and 
Chen have shown results that are similar to the older studies. But, as Blayney and Normile 
note "Because milk marketing orders-both Federal and State-have been in effect for so 
long, it is difficult to determine the extent to which these characteristics would emerge in the 
absence ofFMMO's." There continue to be proposals that would alter or eliminate the 
FMMO system but little analysis of these alternatives exist. Seibert et.al. indicated in 1997 
that sweeping changes were needed in the FMMO system as a result of 
" ... the views held by producers and handlers that the present system has major flaws. 
Perceptions of advantages and disadvantages given to some at the expense of others, 
particularly on a regional basis have lead to protracted debate. The multifaceted character 
of this debate has pitted dairy farmer against dairy farmer, dairy farmer against handler, 
handler against handler and even economist against economist. ... Without industry 
cohesiveness, it is conceivable that an impasse could be reached resulting in elimination 
ofFMMO's, at least in some areas of the county, as early as April 1999." 
While no order was eliminated as early as these authors predicted, on April 1, 2004 a major! 
order was terminated -order 135. 
I A reduction in the number of orders occurred on January 1, 2000 but this did not involve 
termination of an order. At least one other order (Chicago) had been terminated in the past but no 
termination was as large, in terms of the volume of milk, as order 135. 
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Termination of Order 135 
Several factors contributed to the tennination of order 135. Two of the major factors are 
briefly outlined below. 
On January 1. 2000 the Great Basin order (#138) which included Utah, SE Nevada, 
Eastern Idaho and Western Wyoming was combined with the SW Idaho and Eastern Oregon 
orders (fonner order # 135) in 2000 to fonn the new Western order (see figures 1 and 2) . 
This combination was the result of directives given in the 1996 fann bill to reduce the total 
number of milk marketing orders. The new order combined an order that had relatively high 
class I utilization (Great Basin) with an order that had one of the lowest levels of Class I 
(fluid milk) use in the nation (SW Idaho-Eastern Oregon)-see figure 3. As a result, pooled 
milk in the new order shifted producer revenues from producers in the fonner Great Basin 
order to producers in SW Idaho-Eastern Oregon. Most producers in the Great Basin order 
viewed this new pooling as an administrative "taking" of something that was rightfully 
theirs. The straw that figuratively "broke the camels back" occurred in late 2003 when the 
producer price differential (PPD) became negative for several months (figure 4). This change 
was blamed on the new order. As a result, when the vote was taken concerning proposed 
changes2 in the order, the changes were not supported and order 135 was tenninated. 
2The factors indicated above were not the only ones that affected the vote. The key issue 
was associated with pooling provisions, but the vote of producers in Utah (the block vote by 
DF A) was pivotal. 
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Figure 1. Federal Milk Marketing orders before 1 January 2000. 
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Figure 2. Federal Milk Marketing orders in 2000 
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Figure 3. Percent Class I utilization on Great Basin and SW Idaho orders, 1997-1999. 
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Figure 4. Producer price differential for order 135, January 2001-March 2004. 
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What have we learned? 
Seibert et.al. outlined ten functions of a FMMO and suggested what would happen if a 
FMMO was terminated. These included the following: 
1. Minimum classified milk prices and minimum component prices would no longer 
exist. As a result, they also suggested that: 
a. milk prices would become a greater point of competition amongst handlers as 
well as producers and their cooperatives. 
b. prices would change more frequently. 
c. returns to producers would decline. 
2. There would be no uniform blend prices 
3. There would be no specified regional price differentials, zone prices, transportation 
credits or market wide service payments. 
4. No timely payment enforcement 
5. No compensatory payments 
6. No milk payment audits 
7. No enforcement of standards regarding accurate milk component testing and weights 
8. No audits for compliance regarding fund payments 
9. Loss of data 
10. No administrative hearing process. 
These consequences as well as others are outlined and evaluated below. 
Administrative and re~ulatory functions 
Consequences 4, 6, 7, 8 and 10 are all functions that relate to the regulatory or 
administrative functions of a marketing order. The loss of these functions may become 
important in the future but at this point in time they are generally not viewed by producers as 
major losses or consequences of termination of the order #135. One of the fears of 
termination of a FMMO is that there is no longer an independent entity that ensures that the 
market functions (payment enforcement, audits, standards). While these may be valid 
concerns, there is no evidence that any problems of this type have occurred since order 135 
was terminated. It should also be noted that some of these functions can be handled by other 
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entities (e.g., state agencies) and that handlers not meeting industry standards for testing or 
who do not comply with the distribution of fund payments would be subj ect to legal action 
(suits by producers and/or industry organizations). 
The benefits of a hearing process was eliminated for producers in order 135. But, some 
costs were also eliminated. These include the costs of market administration and the burden 
of the producer settlement fund. As a result, administration has been shifted from government 
to the market. 
Milk prices and data 
The remaining consequences outlined by Seibert involve prices and pricing issues. 
Loss of data (consequence #9) 
One of the significant things that did happen with termination of the order was the loss of 
public information about prices and production3. Data on milk utilization by class of use, 
volume, prices and similar data no longer exist as part of a public record. When order 135 
was in existence data on prices paid to producers (at least the minimum's specified by order 
administration) were readily available. In fact, essentially every milk handler used the federal 
order guidelines and regularly paid the minimum prices suggested. There was essentially no 
difference in the prices paid to a producer when producers had the same components (percent 
butterfat, protein, other solids, somatic cell counts, etc.)4. With termination of the order, 
3 The exception is information published by USDA's National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS), for the dairy industry where order #135 was terminated. 
4The price received by every producer depends on the quality/components produced. 
Producers also have differences in deductions associated with dues, marketing costs and 
transportation. As a result, the mailbox price (net price received after all deductions, discounts 
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these data are no longer available to the general public. As a result, data was collected about 
milk handlers by the authors. In Utah a set of producers have provided Godfrey with monthly 
milk checks (usually a minimum of two producers for every processor) for most of the milk 
handlers5 in the state since April 2004. Milk price data for producers in Idaho were obtained 
by Stockton and Gray for some of the largest milk handlers in Idaho. In some cases data was 
provided directly by these firms but in other cases data was obtained from producers for 
some processors. 
Uniform pricing (consequences 2, 3 & 5) 
A FMMO requires that every milk handling firm (exceptions are made for cooperatives) 
within an order has to pay at least the minimum prices specified by the market administrator 
of that order. This allows all producers in the order to share the benefits irrespective of where 
the milk is produced or its end use (fluid, cheese, etc). With termination of order 135 
blending of prices (consequence #2), regional differentials (consequence #3), and 
compensatory payments (consequence #5) are no longer formal considerations in setting 
prices paid to producers. These may occur as noted below but they are on a firm by firm 
basis. As a result, one would expect prices to vary between milk processors or handlers. 
The data obtained from producers in Utah and Idaho after termination of order 135 clearly 
show that there has been a divergence in the prices paid to/received by producers since 
termination of the order. For example, Godfrey has shown that if identical milk (components 
and premiums are accounted for) is the most valid measure of milk price received by a producer. 
5Data for one of the handlers was provided by the firm and not from the producers who 
sold to that firm. 
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and deductions for hauling, advertising, promotion, dues, etc are equal) was sold to the six 
processors in Utah and if200,000 pounds of milk was sold each month the difference in 
revenue between the six handlers would be over $30,000 for the period 1 April 2004 through 
1 April 2005. 
Many of the handlers in Utah continue to use FMMO prices for each class of milk but 
PPD's are no longer uniform. The PPD6 was commonly uniform for all handlers before the 
order was terminated but each firm now apparently7 determines the PPD they use based on 
what classes of milk that firm sells. As a result of differences in the prices paid by handlers 
there is considerable interest by some producers to seek a handler that pays a higher price as 
suggested by Seibert. As predicated this has strained the relationship between many 
producers who have historically sold to the dominate coop in Utah (Dairy Farmers of 
America or DF A). 
Price decline 
Most authors, including Seibert, have predicted that the prices paid to producers would 
decline if an order was terminated. There is no evidence that this has generally occurred 
following termination of order 135. The prices paid by some processors may have declined 
relative to the prices that would have existed had the order remained because there was no 
sharing of class I revenues. But, given the low levels of fluid milk utilization (percentages 
were generally in the teens) in this area, Class I utilization was not a major contributor to 
6The producer price differential (PPD) is basically how much the value of handler receipts 
over the market area exceeds the class ill price of milk (Jesse and Cropp). 
7There is no information concerning how these are determined. 
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higher average prices. This is especially true in months when negative PPD's resulted in 
lower prices than would have existed had producers been paid just for cheese (Class ill 
prices)-negative PPD's were common for processors who have retained the FMMO pricing 
guidelines and use plant level PPD' s. 
Less than a year after order 135 was terminated many of the processors in both states 
changed the way prices were determined. Many of the handlers in Utah and Idaho only 
produce cheese. As a result, the prices they pay are based on cheese yields using national 
cheese prices---- NASS or CME prices for cheese, somatic cell (SCC) count and whey prices 
are the key variables. 
Several authors that have evaluated the FMMO system have emphasized the point that 
there is a difference in the price elasticity between fluid and manufactured milk products and 
that producer revenues can be increased as a result of these differences. If milk is restricted 
for fluid milk use (relatively inelastic) and increased for manufactured milk products 
(inelastic but more elastic than it is for fluid milk), producer revenues can be increased. 
Furthermore, these authors suggest that producer revenues would eventually decline without 
an order as a result of shifting milk from one use to the other. But, no empirical evidence has 
been found that indicates that milk handlers purposely shift milk from fluid to manufacturing 
products in an effort to take advantage of the possible differences in the elasticity of demand 
in these two general areas of the market. In fact to the contrary, prices paid by some handlers 
who emphasize fluid milk in the terminated order have increased the prices paid producers. 
These processors could have paid more than the minimum prices when the order existed but 
were not required to do so. In addition, policies of the milk marketing boards (state orders) 
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in Montana and Nevada require that minimum prices be paid for milk used for fluid 
consumption. Higher prices and reduced sales would be emphasized if shifting between uses 
was allowed instead of the requirement to pay a minimum price. This suggests that 
processors in these two states were not shifting use from fluid to manufactured products in an 
efforts to capture revenues associated with differing elasticities. In addition, most of the 
advertising sponsored by the dairy industry (e.g., "got milk" and "got mustache" campaigns) 
emphasize increased sale of fluid milk. Furthermore, retailers often feature milk with reduced 
prices, as a "loss leader", to induce consumers to come to their store. This suggests that 
most of the inefficiencies attributed to the FMMO may be theoretically correct but are 
probably not used. There is simply no empirical evidence in any of the studies reviewed or in 
the data obtained as part of this study that supports the contention that reduced quantities of 
fluid milk are offered for sale in an effort to increase prices and revenue for producers. The 
studies that have emphasized this point (HeImberger and Chen; Ippolito and Mason; Price; 
Kessel) may therefore represent theoretical pieces which are not substantiated (to our 
knowledge) by empirical evidence8. The reason stems from the structure of the milk market. 
Owner-producer coops are the primary providers of milk used by processors (Ling) and there 
is no empirical evidence that indicates they can or are willing to limit fluid milk sales. 
Furthermore, under the current FMMO system prices for all classes of milk are 
administratively set by formula and are based on market prices for cheese, butter and non fat 
dry milk. The incentive therefore is to sell as much product as possible at current market 
8Most of these studies use data to estimate what impact would occur if this practice 
existed but none of these studies provide empirical evidence that this practice, in fact, occurs. 
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prices, behavior that is common in a competitive market where no firm has the ability to shift 
use to a different class of use in order to capture potential benefits. It should also be noted 
that the marketing chain for fluid milk sales is significantly different for fluid milk than it is 
for manufactured products. Fluid milk is processed and distributed through the retail market 
(Walmart, Kroeger, etc) while manufactured products are primarily sold to firms in the food 
service industry (McDonalds, Pizza Hut, Taco Time, etc). Shifting milk between 
these two general food chains is probably not likely in today's world even if the elasticities 
for these products were significantly different9. 
Price Volatility 
It should also be noted that Novakovic suggested that one of the benefits of a FMMO was 
that they reduce price uncertainty. Seibert also suggested that prices paid to producers would 
change more frequently following termination of an order. This has generally not been 
observed since termination of order 135. 
In an effort to provide some empirical evidence of price volatility before and after 
termination of order 135, price data for firms and mail box prices (net prices received by 
producers) were evaluated. These data are shown in tables 1 and 2. These data show that 
mailbox price volatility at most (Wisconsin is the exception) of the locations evaluated has 
declined (lower coefficient of variation or CV) since order 135 was terminated (this should 
not be interpreted as a cause and effect relationship). The data in Table 2 also shows that the 
9The elasticity of demand at the retail level are commonly assumed in the studies 
reviewed. They do not consider the elasticity of derived demand for manufactured dairy products 
in the food service industry. 
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coefficient of variation for prices paid by the firms in Idaho and Utah was mixed when 
compared to mailbox prices in most of the orders after termination. One can therefore not 
conclude that prices became more or less volatile in Utah and Idaho following termination of 
order 135. Increased volatility, as predicted, may not have occurred for several reasons but, 
the following may be the most important reasons. 
First, negotiations between producers and handlers in the area where order 135 existed 
have become more common since the order was terminated. For example, about a year after 
the order was terminated one of the handlers negotiated a fixed price with its producers. This 
price was based on both historic and futures prices and is set annually. In this particular case, 
the volatility was eliminated for an entire year. 
Secondly, data for the processors that were surveyed in Idaho indicated that essentially all 
of the major handlers in Idaho have adopted pricing methods that have little relationship with 
FMMO formula and guidelineslO and are generally more closely associated with its value as 
cheese. These firms have commonly added premiums and discounts (greater emphasis on 
quality factors) that were not easily applied when order 135 existed. These pricing changes 
may have increased uncertainty to some degree, but it has aligned processor and producers 
toward the end use of the milk being produced. It should also be noted that while order 135 
existed the PPD was the most variable part of the prices paid to producers (see figure 4)-the 
coefficient of variation for the PPD for order 135 from January 1, 2000 to April 1, 2004 was 
0.93. Those processors that currently use the FMMO formulas and also have a PPD generally 
IOOne firm in Idaho uses the FMMO formula for Class III milk (cheese). 
13 
have relatively higher price volatility than those firms that no longer use a PPD. But, even 
those firms that continue to use a PPD have no more price volatile than the FMMO mailbox 
prices in the orders shown in Table 1. This suggests that volatility may be affected more by 
utilization than national price data for cheese, butter and NFDM which are used to set prices 
paid to producers within as well as outside the FMMO system. This suggests that price 
volatility may be affected more by utilization than national price data for butter, cheese and 
NFDM which are used to set prices within as well as outside the FMMO system. 
Cooperati ve loyalty 
Cropp suggests that ifFMMO did not exist "Dairy cooperatives would be under pressure 
to pay producers competitive prices [and that] producer loyalty to cooperatives would be 
based on pay rather than cooperative tenure and loyalty." This has also occurred, at least in 
Utah, where some long time coop members have 'jumped ship" to firms that pay higher 
pnces. 
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Table l. Mean ($ per cwt) and coefficient of variation (CV) of monthly mail box prices for 
selected states and orders before and after termination of order 135. 
State or FMMO January 1, 2000 April 1, 2004 to March 
to April 1, 2004 1,2006 
Mean CV Mean CV 
Northeast 13.21 .14 15.96 .08 
Florida 16.05 .11 18.10 .08 
Wisconsin 13.22 .14 16.13 .11 
Northwest 12.44 .13 14.41 .07 
All orders 13.08 .14 15.52 .08 
California 12.20 .14 14.29 .10 
New Mexico 12.05 .14 13.70 .09 
Idaho 12.06 .14 nd nd 
Utah 1l.91 .16 nd nd 
Source: http://www.fmma30.comIHomepage/F030-MailboxPrices.htm 
Table 2. Coefficient of Variation of monthly milk prices paid to producers by firms in Utah 
and Idaho for the period April 1, 2004 to 1 March 2006. 
Firm CV Firm C 
V 
A .10 B .11 
C .11 D .09 
E F 
G .14 H .05 
I .10 J .07 
Firms are not identified by name to maintain confidentiality 
Data are only for processors who cooperated or were provided by producers 
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Other lessons learned 
One of the first lessons that was learned with termination of order 135, is that pooling of 
revenues will likely lead to termination of an order if there are differences in the utilization of 
milk with in that order. This suggests that larger pools including proposals to have a smaller 
number of orders than currently exist will probably not be successful in the long run because: 
a) producers which have high levels or fluid milk utilization will resist pooling revenues with 
those having lower levels of fluid milk utilization and b) firms will have an incentive to pool 
milk (paper and/or real) on a high class I utilization order(s) to obtain the benefits ofFMMO 
formula pricing. However, it should be noted that the advantages of pooling across orders 
will diminish as if large differences in class I utilization for areas/regions do not exist. It 
must be remembered that fluid milk consumption per capita continues to decline while per 
capita consumption of cheese is increasing. When cheese prices rapidly rise, the class III 
price is higher than the price of Class I milk under the FMMO system and negative PPD's 
occur. In this case milk prices are lower than they would be for firms that were based on 
cheese prices. Furthermore, as the percentage of milk going to fluid consumption declines 
(see figure 5), the advantage of being in an order is diminished because less of the higher 
priced fluid milk, under FMMO classification guidelines, is pooled. 
The PPD's that have been determined by milk handlers since termination of order 135 
suggest that how milk is pooled can make a difference in the prices received. For example, 
large national cooperatives such as Dairy Farmers of America (DF A) have the ability to pool 
milk for their producers over wide areas and across several FMMO's. This e~sentially negates 
the existence of FMMO boundaries when order provisions do not limit the pooling of milk 
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within an organization. The ability of handlers to pool milk (either physically or on paperll) 
also suggests that FMMO boundaries are artificial at best. Furthermore, the size of these large 
cooperatives and their immunity under the Capper-Volstead act may result monopoly profits 
(Masson and Eisenstat) which might be inferred by the growth in cooperative dominance in 
milk procurement (Ling). 
Conclusions 
Perhaps the most important lesson learned with the termination of order 135 is that "life 
goes on" without an order and that market forces are apparently sufficient, at least in this 
case, to insure that rational and orderly marketing behaviors and outcomes occur. This 
suggests that FMMO's as they currently exist may have run their course and may be obsolete. 
One area of concern however, is the availability of market information if all FMMO were 
abolished. National data are available for cheese, butter and NFDM prices12 • These data are 
being used by processors and FMMO administrators to set prices. However, local level 
information is commonly not available when a FMMO does not exist. This may not be a 
problem for some producers because they are of sufficient size that they can devote resources 
to the acquisition of market information. The lack of market information does represent an 
area were at least some of the functions of the FMMO system has been a benefit to producers. 
This suggests that some functions of the FMMO could/should be retained but the need for 
the regulatory and pricing functions are probably better served by market forces instead of 
liThe ability of firms to pool milk on an order with limited physical delivery is one of the 
most troublesome issues faced in order hearings. 
12Some question the validity of these data but, they are widely used and accepted (Miller). 
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administrative rules in today's environment. If current developments in the industry such as 
product dominance, processed versus fluid milk, and the increasing size/scale of dairy fanns 
continue the current order system may not survive and tennination of other orders will likely 
occur. 
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Figure 5. Percentage of milk being used for fluid consumption in the United States, 1947-
2005. 
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